Fordham Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 6

Article 4

2014

Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor
Jack P. Sahl
University of Akron School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jack P. Sahl, Cracks in the Profession’s Monopoly Armor, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2635 (2014).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol82/iss6/4

This Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

CRACKS IN THE PROFESSION’S
MONOPOLY ARMOR
Jack P. Sahl*
INTRODUCTION
The legal profession in the United States continues to enjoy its long-held
monopoly in the nation’s legal services market.1 Historically, American
courts are largely responsible for this monopoly and have relied on their
“[a]ffirmative [i]nherent [p]ower . . . to regulate . . . every aspect of the
practice of law.”2 For example, courts establish standards for admitting and
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Miller-Becker Center for Professional
Responsibility at the University of Akron School of Law. The author would like to thank
Art Garwin, Director of the American Bar Association Center for Professional
Responsibility, Professors Stefan Padfield and Joann Sahl of the University of Akron School
of Law, Frank E. Quirk, Director of the Miller-Becker Center, and Steve Crossland, Chair of
the Washington State Bar Association’s Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT) Board,
for their helpful comments. I am especially indebted to Joseph Manno for his excellent
research and assistance. My thanks to Professor Bruce A. Green, Director of the Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics, for inviting me to participate in this Colloquium, The Legal
Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014).
1. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 824–27 (1986) (highlighting
how the lawyer monopoly over much of the legal process today results from the combination
of courts and lawyers controlling bar admission and state courts enforcing “common-law and
statutory prohibitions against the unauthorized practice [of law]” (UPL), and noting that a
“vigorous and expansive doctrine” of UPL did not occur in America until “sometime after
the First World War”); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1981) (“[T]he profession has engaged in disturbingly little introspection
concerning the proper scope of its monopoly.”).
2. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 24; see, e.g., NISHA, LLC v. TriBuilt Constr. Grp.,
LLC, 388 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Ark. 2012) (reversing a court ruling that a hearing’s arbitrator
could decide who would represent the parties and holding that the state supreme court has
“exclusive authority” to regulate the practice of law); id. at 451 (“[A] nonlawyer’s
representation of a corporation in arbitration proceedings constitutes [UPL].”); Cleveland
Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Davie, 977 N.E.2d 606, 616 (Ohio 2012) (holding that the state supreme
court “has exclusive power to regulate, control, and define the practice of law in Ohio” and
“if a statute or administrative rule purports to permit laypersons to practice law before a
board or an administrative agency, this court retains the ultimate authority to determine what
activities a layperson” may undertake before committing UPL); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013) (“The legal profession is largely self-governing. . . .
[U]ltimate authority over the legal profession is vested largely in the courts.”); WOLFRAM,
supra note 1, at 79 (“The history of the regulation of the legal profession in the United States
and England is primarily that of supervision by courts.”); cf. Brown v. Gerstein, 460 N.E.2d
1043, 1052 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (holding that the practice of law is a practice or trade and
thus subject to consumer protection statutes); In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 777 (Tenn.
1995) (deciding that the state legislature may authorize nonlawyer tax agents).
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disciplining lawyers,3 and defining the unauthorized practice of law (UPL).
This, in effect, excludes competition from nonlawyers4 and charges lawyers
for court activities, including the operation of lawyer and judicial regulatory
and disciplinary systems.5
Courts often rely on bar associations for valuable input regarding these
regulatory activities.6 Most notably, bar associations propose and assist
courts in adopting ethics codes establishing behavioral norms for the

3. WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that traditionally, “in many American
jurisdictions, courts alone are authorized to discipline lawyers. And normally that power is
reserved to the state’s supreme court which typically delegates its exercise to a lawyer
disciplinary agency” (citation omitted)); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.
para. 10.
4. UPL is broadly defined and construed in many states. See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R.
VII(2)(A) (providing that UPL is “[t]he rendering of [or holding out to the public that one
could render] legal services for another by any person not admitted to practice in Ohio under
Rule I of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar unless the person”
qualifies for one of several exceptions, including being a licensed legal intern or a registered
foreign legal consultant). For examples of nonlawyer UPL, see Hansen v. Hansen, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 688, 689 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a personal representative of a decedent’s
estate who is not a licensed lawyer cannot appear “in propria persona” on behalf of the estate
in matters outside the probate proceedings); Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, 689
So. 2d 255, 259 (Fla. 1997) (finding UPL where salespersons and other employees
“answered specific legal questions; determined the appropriateness of a living trust based on
a customer’s particular needs and circumstances; [and] assembled, drafted and executed the
documents”); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Joelson, 872 N.E.2d 1207, 1208 (Ohio 2007) (holding
that a nonlawyer committed UPL when he prepared, signed, and filed documents in four
lawsuits, including complaints, on behalf of Team Sports, Inc. because UPL is not limited to
court appearances but includes “the preparation of papers . . . on another’s behalf”
concerning a lawsuit (citing Cleveland Bar Ass’n. v. Misch, 695 N.E.2d 244 (Ohio 1998))).
UPL also restricts the ability of lawyers to practice law in other states unless they become
licensed to practice law. Lawyers can apply to the court in a state that they are not admitted
for pro hac vice status, permitting the lawyer to represent someone in particular litigation in
that state court. The lawyer must apply for a license in the foreign jurisdiction if the lawyer
intends to practice in a foreign state court on more than an occasional basis. ABA Model
Rule 5.5, commonly referred to as the multijurisdictional practice (MJP) rule, permits
lawyers to represent persons in a jurisdiction where they are not licensed if the representation
is only on a temporary basis and does not involve the lawyer appearing before a tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 5.5. For a recent and excellent discussion about the
many issues and problems concerning UPL statutes and enforcement, see Arthur F.
Greenbaum, Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 5.5—An Interim Assessment, 43 AKRON L. REV. 729 (2010); see also Rhode, supra
note 1.
5. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 24–25.
6. See id. at 33–34 (observing that while appellate courts exercise power and initiative
in regulating the legal profession, “courts serve as the largely passive sounding boards and
official approvers or disapprovers of initiatives that are taken by lawyers operating through
bar associations”); see also John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959,
965 (2009) (“[S]tate supreme courts were . . . the prime regulators [and] typically acting in
interplay with the bar.”); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1147 (2009). See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional
Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 707 (1977) (contending that lawyers drafted rules to
promote their own interests in a self-regulatory context).
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profession and standards and processes for lawyer admission and
discipline.7
But “the times they are a-changin’,” as Bob Dylan notes in the title of his
song.8 Today, the law governing lawyers cannot be found in a single body
of ethics rules, such as the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, produced internally by the “traditional duo of
courts and bar associations.”9 Legislators, administrators, and federal
judges are no longer willing to defer to state courts or bar associations.10
As a result, the law governing lawyers is increasingly fragmented because
authorities—many of them federal and external to the profession—now
regulate lawyer behavior.11 This fragmentation has created a myriad of
challenges and problems for regulators and the bar. It has prompted one
expert to comment: “We are witnessing the decline of the ideal of
professional self-regulation at the same time that the ideal has been almost
entirely demolished in England.”12
Although there are new regulators and related concerns, the “traditional
duo of courts and bar associations” still plays a leading role in shaping the
profession’s behavioral norms and preserving its monopoly over the
This Article addresses two recent
delivery of legal services.13
developments by the courts and bar associations that significantly affect—
or create cracks in—the profession’s monopoly on the delivery of legal
services.
Part I considers the Conference of Chief Justices’ (CCJ) recent adoption
of Resolution 15, “Encouraging Adoption of Rules Regarding Admission of
Attorneys Who Are Dependents of Service Members.”14 Resolution 15
7. See, e.g., Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct, TENN. B. ASS’N,
http://www.tba.org/info/tennessee-rules-of-professional-conduct (last visited Apr. 26, 2014)
(tracing the development of the Tennessee rules).
8. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’
(Columbia Records 1964). The scope and magnitude of change buffeting all aspects of the
legal profession is dramatic. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Task Force Backs Changes in Legal
Education System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2013, at A16 (reporting that the recent American
Bar Association Task Force on the Future of Legal Education’s draft report calls for urgent
and sweeping changes in legal education, and describing “the predicament of the many
recent graduates who may never get the kind of jobs they anticipated” as “‘particularly
compelling’”).
9. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 959.
10. Id. at 961.
11. Id. at 961–62. For example, a host of federal agencies, like the SEC, have enacted
rules governing the practice of law. Id. at 961 & n.6; see also Ted Schneyer, An
Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REV. 559 (2005); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 11 (2013) (“To the
extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for
government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s
independence from government domination.”).
12. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 959, 961.
13. See id. at 961 (asserting that most new regulators tend to be federal).
14. Resolution 15: Encouraging Adoption of Rules Regarding Admission of Attorneys
Who Are Dependents of Service Members, CONF. CHIEF JUSTICES (July 25, 2012),
http://msjdn.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/conference-of-chief-justices-resolution-15military-spouse-admission-final.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 15]. Resolution 15 uses the
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urges state bar admission authorities to “develop[] and implement[] rules
permitting admission without examination for attorneys who are
dependents” of United States service members.15 Resolution 15 represents
a significant doctrinal break with the longstanding tradition that lawyers
must take an examination before being licensed to practice law in a
jurisdiction unless their prior experience allows them to waive into that
jurisdiction. The CCJ’s new approach to regulating admission promotes
competition from within the bar by facilitating the movement of lawyers
from one geographic market to another.
Part II of this Article discusses the Washington Supreme Court’s new
Admission to Practice Rule (APR) 28, titled “Limited Practice Rule for
Limited License Legal Technicians” (LLLT), and its impact on the
profession’s legal services monopoly.16 The LLLT rule “allow[s] licensed
legal technicians to help civil litigants navigate the court system.”17
Washington’s LLLT rule promotes competition from professionals—
nonlawyer technicians—who are outside the bar.
The Article concludes that both developments—Resolution 15 and
Washington’s LLLT rule—promise to enhance competition for the delivery
of legal services, but in different ways. This Article contends that both
Resolution 15 and Washington’s LLLT rule will indeed enhance consumer
welfare.
I. RESOLUTION 15: A DOCTRINAL BREAK FROM GEOGRAPHIC BARRIERS
In recent years, there has been significant interest in, and support for,
U.S. military personnel and their families from the public and the legal
profession.18 For example, on January 24, 2011, President Barack Obama,

phrase, “Dependents of Service Members,” which includes more than just military spouse
attorneys. Id. An earlier ABA Resolution 108, Admission by Endorsement, used the phrase
“military spouse attorneys” when eliminating licensing barriers for military dependents who
are lawyers. AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 108
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_
delegates/resolutions/2012_hod_midyear_meeting_108.doc.
Most of the literature
addressing the topic generally also uses the phrase “military spouse lawyers.” This Article
will use the latter term, in part because military spouse attorneys probably constitute the
largest number of military dependents affected by the rule. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that Resolution 15’s use of “dependents” potentially includes nonspouse attorneys. See
NAT’L MILITARY FAMILY ASS’N, FACT SHEET: DEFINITION OF A DEPENDENT 1 (2005),
available at http://support.militaryfamily.org/site/DocServer/Definiton_of_a_Dependent_1105.pdf?docID=3621 (defining the term military dependents).
15. Resolution 15, supra note 14.
16. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License
Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf
(adopting the new Admission to Practice Rule 28: “Limited Practice Rule for Limited
License Legal Technicians”).
17. Debra Cassens Weiss, In Washington State, ‘Legal Technicians’ Will Be Allowed To
Help Civil Litigants, A.B.A. J. (June 19, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/in_washington_state_legal_technicians_will_be_allowed_to_help_civil_litigan/.
18. See, e.g., Amber Nimocks, Admission Rules Relaxed for Military Spouse-Attorneys
in North Carolina, N.C. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 9, 2013, at 9; Illinois Supreme Court Announces
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First Lady Michelle Obama, and Dr. Jill Biden presented a document titled
Strengthening Our Military Families: Meeting America’s Commitment in
response to a presidential study directive calling for a comprehensive
federal approach by government agencies to improve support for military
personnel and their families.19 The document outlined forty-seven
initiatives by sixteen federal agencies to improve support for military
families. The First Lady and Dr. Biden promised to pursue such
improvement through their Joining Forces initiative dedicated to connecting
military personnel and their spouses with the necessary resources to obtain
jobs.20
Many Americans have some sense of military families’ hardships and
sacrifices in serving the nation, especially given recent U.S. involvement in
several international conflicts.21 One of the many challenges confronting
military families concerns military spouse lawyers. Because of frequent
relocations, they often encounter serious licensure hurdles in their efforts to
pursue legal careers.22
Military families are forced to move every two to three years in addition
to temporary or extended unaccompanied deployments.23 The impact of

New Measures To Improve Legal Services for the Disadvantaged, ILL. LAW. NOW (June 24,
2013 10:28 AM), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2013/06/18/illinois-supreme-court-announces-newmeasures-improve-legal-services-disadvantaged; Your Turn, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS,
Mar. 2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 4214508. Current publicity for helping military
spouses includes support from Stephen Spielberg, Oprah Winfrey, and Tom Hanks. See
What We’ve Been Doing, WHITE HOUSE JOINING FORCES, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
joiningforces/photo-video (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
19. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUPPORTING OUR MILITARY
FAMILIES: BEST PRACTICES FOR STREAMLINING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING ACROSS STATE
LINES 2 (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/pdf/Occupational_Licensing_
and_Military_Spouses_Report_vFINAL.PDF; see MARY REDING & ERIN MASSON WIRTH,
REPORT TO CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (n.d.) (on file with Fordham Law Review).
20. Support for Our Heroes, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
joiningforces (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (reporting that “Joining Forces is all about coming
together to support our nation’s military families” and ensuring that “no veteran has to fight
for a job at home after they fight for our nation overseas”).
21. One hardship for military families is the difficulty faced by spouses seeking
employment. This is a serious problem but is often overshadowed by other pressing
problems, such as posttraumatic stress disorder or helping wounded veterans.
Many occupations require a state license, often with state-specific conditions and
processes, which can cause lengthy re-employment delays for military spouses
moving between states. Because of these delays and the expense involved in relicensure, many spouses decide not to practice in their professions. This is a
difficult financial and career choice issue for military members and their spouses,
potentially impacting their desire to stay in the military: more than two thirds of
married service members report their spouse’s inability to maintain a career
impacts their decision to remain in the military by a large or moderate extent.
Issue 2, USA 4 MILITARY FAMILIES, http://www.usa4militaryfamilies.dod.mil/pls/psgprod/
f?p=USA4:ISSUE:0::::P2_ISSUE:2 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
22. MARY B. CRANSTON, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION,
REPORT 3 (2012), available at http://lawyerist.com/lawyerist/wp-content/uploads/2012/
04/ABA+108+Fnl.pdf.
23. Id. at 6 n.21 (citing DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., MILITARY FAMILY LIFE PROJECT
(2010), available at conferences.cna.org/pdfs/longitudinalstudy.pdf) (reporting that active
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these frequent moves is reflected in national statistics that show:
(1) military spouses are more likely to be unemployed than their civilian
counterparts; (2) military wives suffer a higher rate of underemployment
than civilian counterparts; and (3) employed military wives earn less than
civilian wives.24 The Department of Defense Military Community and
Family Office has addressed some of the licensing barriers that confront
military spouses through state legislation.25 The practice of law, however,
is not regulated by the legislature, and redress must be sought from the state
courts.26
The Military Spouse JD Network (MSJDN) reports that less than onethird of its members are employed in full-time legal positions and that
approximately half are underemployed in paralegal positions or part-time
work.27 MSJDN members claim that state licensing barriers hinder their
employment opportunities, because rules for admission by motion or
through reciprocity are too limited.28 For example, military spouses have
difficulty in meeting the “‘previous practice’ requirements when: they are
recently admitted; their military spouse has been assigned overseas; they
have breaks in employment between duty stations; they have held nonattorney or part-time positions; or have been unable to find legal work at a
duty station.”29 The consequence of not satisfying state rules regarding
admission by motion is significant: the applicant will have to pass an
arduous two-and-a-half- to three-and-a-half-day, written bar examination
and undergo a thorough character and fitness investigation.
One report argues that these barriers create a significant cost for the
public and the military families who are deprived of a spouse’s income.30
The resulting economic and related stress from this loss of spousal income
exacts a significant psychological toll on the spouse and family.31 The loss
may also cause the nonlawyer spouse to leave the military.32 The report
contends that these costs warrant different licensure treatment for military
spouse lawyers.33
The report further articulates several benefits to eliminating or
minimizing licensure barriers. First, even after being transferred, military
duty spouses thirty years old and younger move every thirty-three months on average
because of change of duty station).
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See ABA MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (2012) (requiring applicants to
have practiced for three of the five years prior to applying for admission); AM. BAR ASS’N
COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_
meeting_105d_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf (accompanying the model rule on
practice pending admission).
31. See CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 7.
32. Id. at 4.
33. See id. at 1.
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spouse lawyers can continue to provide legal services to their clients. From
a client perspective, clients are able to retain counsel of choice, which
promotes consumer preference. “As technology improves, more clients and
employers want to retain military spouse attorneys who are transferred.”34
UPL rules in many states, however, prohibit military spouse attorneys from
“maintain[ing] their employment and continuing to serve their clients when
transferred to and residing in a new jurisdiction.”35
Another benefit of eliminating licensure barriers for military spouse
lawyers is that it furthers access to justice for military personnel and their
families. Military spouse attorneys have developed unique skills that
benefit their clients and possess special insights concerning the
“complexities of military life and are well suited to serve clients in the
military, either through paid or volunteer work.”36 Many of these militaryrelated clients may lack adequate resources to obtain legal services. A 2010
military survey found that 27 percent of service members have more than
$10,000 in debt compared to 16 percent of civilians, and that more than
one-third of military families have trouble paying monthly bills.37 Lawyers
who are military spouses are uniquely positioned to possess a special
sensitivity for assisting military families and veterans because their families
may be similarly situated financially and may understand military culture.
For example, they may understand family problems resulting from frequent
redeployments. This similarity in family experiences creates a good
opportunity for military spouse lawyers to provide a more holistic approach
to delivering legal services that addresses all of the client’s needs.38
Against this backdrop, the CCJ adopted Resolution 15.39
Not
surprisingly, given the nation’s support for military personnel and their
34. Id. at 9.
35. Id. at 9 n.31 (citing State Bar of Ariz., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm.,
Advisory Op. 10-02 (2010), available at www.azbar.org/media/75280/upl10-02.pdf).
36. Id. at 9.
37. FINRA INVESTOR EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 13
(2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/foundation/@foundation/documents/
foundation/p122257.pdf; see also Donna Gordon Blankinship, Mil Fams Face Money
Problems, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/spouse/military-life/military-resources/
mil-fams-often-face-financial-struggles.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (citing a 2010
military survey reporting that the unemployment rate among military spouses is 26 percent,
and noting that a staff sergeant’s annual salary is about $39,000, not much money to support
a family, especially when one member is sent overseas for long periods).
38. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46 (2d ed. 2009).
39. Resolution 15 provides:
WHEREAS, the states’ highest courts regard an effective system of admission
and regulation of the legal profession as an important responsibility for the
protection of the public; and
WHEREAS, the Department of Defense has recognized that military spouses
face unique licensing and employment challenges as they move frequently in
support of the nation’s defense; and
WHEREAS, the American Bar Association adopted a policy in February 2012
recognizing that these short-term, compulsory moves for attorneys married to
military service members result in unique problems that should be addressed by
amending traditional bar admission rules; and
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families, the CCJ encountered little resistance in adopting Resolution 15 on
July 25, 2012.40
A. Resolution 15—The Assault on Territorial Restraints
Resolution 15’s first provision underscores the courts’ fundamental
gatekeeper function concerning admission and regulation of the legal
profession. It provides that the “states’ highest courts regard an effective
system of admission and regulation of the legal profession as an important
responsibility for the protection of the public.”41 This opening proposition
is not particularly noteworthy given state courts’ long tradition of regulating
the profession to protect the public’s interest.
What is noteworthy however, is Resolution 15’s last provision. It breaks
with the longstanding notion that lawyers generally have to take a
burdensome written examination before being licensed to practice law in
another state. The CCJ in Resolution 15 now “urges the bar admission
authorities in each state and territory to consider the development and
implementation of rules permitting admission without examination for
attorneys who are dependents of service members . . . and who have
graduated from ABA accredited law schools and who are already admitted
to practice in another state or territory.”42 Resolution 15’s four other
WHEREAS, state bar admission authorities and state supreme courts remain
responsible for making admission decisions and enforcing their own rules for
admission; and
WHEREAS, issues relating to knowledge of local law can be addressed through
a mandatory educational component;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of Chief Justices
urges the bar admission authorities in each state and territory to consider the
development and implementation of rules permitting admission without
examination for attorneys who are dependents of service members of the United
States Uniformed Services and who have graduated from ABA accredited law
schools and who are already admitted to practice in another state or territory.
Resolution 15, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
40. See Telephone Interview with Robert N. Baldwin, Exec. Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Oct. 16, 2013) (stating that Resolution 15 was adopted
without any reported opposition). The CCJ adopted Resolution 15 as proposed by the CCJ
Professionalism and Competence of the Bar (PCB) Committee at the 2012 Annual Meeting
on July 25, 2012. Id. The PCB Committee had access to a “Report to the Conference of
Chief Justices” submitted by Mary Reding, President and Co-Founder of the Military Spouse
JD Network, and the Honorable Erin Masson Wirth, Co-Founder of the Military Spouse JD
Network. Id. The CCJ discussed the special challenges facing military spouse lawyers and
the need for a proposed resolution to eliminate licensing barriers. Id. The PCB materials for
the meeting included a draft rule. Id. The lack of modification to the PCB Committee
proposal may reflect broad support within the CCJ for Resolution 15. See, e.g., Brad Cooper,
Military Spouse Attorneys Answer the Joining Forces Challenge, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (June
14, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/06/14/military-spouse-attorneysanswer-joining-forces-challenge (reporting that ABA Resolution 108, a rough counterpart to
CCJ Resolution 15, was passed by the “500+ members of the ABA House of Delegates . . .
without any opposition”).
41. Resolution 15, supra note 14.
42. Id. (emphasis added). The ABA recently adopted a Model Rule on Practice Pending
Admission Application (MRPPA) aimed at lessening the disruption to a lawyer’s career and
life by permitting a lawyer to practice for up to a year upon applying for application to the
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provisions support one of these two principles—the authority of state courts
to regulate the bar, including admission,43 or the case for admission without
examination.44
Admission without examination for lawyers is not a new concept.45 The
organized bar and state courts have long recognized the highly mobile
nature of the bar and the concern that an examination complicates, if not
deters, lawyer mobility.46 Most states have addressed this concern and the
corresponding need to protect the public from unqualified lawyers by
adopting admission-by-motion rules.47
The ABA’s Model Rule on Admission by Motion is the prototype for
state rules.48 It requires, in part, an applicant to be “primarily engaged in
the active practice of law . . . for three of the five years immediately

bar and notifying the state’s regulatory authority. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20,
supra note 30. Washington, D.C., instituted a policy of admission pending application prior
to the ABA Rule. Id.
43. See Resolution 15, supra note 14 (“[S]tate supreme courts remain responsible for
making admission decisions . . . .”).
44. See id. (“[R]ecogniz[ing] that military spouses face unique licensing and
employment challenges as they move frequently in support of the nation’s defense . . . .”);
see also REDING & WIRTH, supra note 19 (providing the CCJ with important information
about why lawyer-spouses of military personnel should be admitted on motion).
45. Wisconsin provides perhaps the most unique and longest exception to the general
rule of lawyers having to pass an examination for bar admission. Graduates of Wisconsin
law schools are admitted automatically to practice law without examination. WIS. SUP. CT. R.
40.03. Wisconsin’s admission without examination policy has not jeopardized the public’s
interest in competent and ethical legal services. See, e.g., Beverly Moran, The Wisconsin
Diploma Privilege: Try It, You’ll Like It, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 645; see also Wiesmueller v.
Kosobucki, No. 07-CV-211-BBC, 2009 WL 4722197 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 2009) (dismissing
a recent court challenge to that rule).
46. The ABA’s new MRPPA reflects the organized bar’s appreciation for the increased
mobility and accompanying licensure challenges of its members. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N
ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 30. The MRPPA allows a lawyer who holds a license to
practice law in another U.S. jurisdiction and who has engaged in active practice for three of
the last five years, to provide legal services in a new jurisdiction without a license for no
more than 365 days. The lawyer must meet other criteria too, including notifying the
Disciplinary Counsel and the Admissions Authority in writing prior to initiating practice and
not being the subject of a disciplinary matter.
47. Thirty-nine states permit admission without examination if the lawyer satisfies a
number of conditions. Many of these states add a reciprocity condition, namely that the state
the lawyer is departing from must accord admission without examination to members of the
lawyer’s new state. See AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., ADMISSION BY MOTION RULES (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/adm
ission_motion_rules.authcheckdam.pdf; see, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 34 (providing for
admission by motion if certain conditions are met, including reciprocal admission rules for
Arizona lawyers in the state that the lawyer is departing); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch, No. CV-12-1724-PHX-BSB, 2013 WL 5297140 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 19, 2013) (challenging the rule); see also Joan C. Rogers, Limiting Admission on
Motion to Lawyers from States with Reciprocity Is Not Illegal, 29 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 610 (Sept. 23, 2013) (reporting that Arizona’s reciprocity requirement in its
admission by motion rule is constitutional and effectuates “the state’s legitimate interest in
regulating the practice of law for public protection purposes” and “encourage[s] other states
to admit Arizona attorneys on similar terms” (citing Berch, 2013 WL 5297140)).
48. MODEL RULE ON ADMISSION BY MOTION (as amended Aug. 6, 2012).
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preceding” the date of application, to be in good standing in all jurisdictions
where the lawyer is currently licensed and not currently subject to lawyer
discipline or the subject of a pending discipline matter, and to demonstrate
the requisite fitness and good character to practice law.49 These
requirements advance the ABA’s goal of protecting the public from
unqualified lawyers while facilitating lawyer mobility. Essentially the
courts, bar, and the public have a three-year track record of legal work to
assess the lawyer’s competency, ethics, and professionalism.50 In addition,
the admission-without-examination rule assumes that the newly admitted
lawyer will not harm clients or the courts by failing to learn local law and
practice—a frequently cited justification for requiring an examination
before bar admission.51
Not all lawyers can meet state requirements for admission by motion.
For example, many lawyers, including military spouses, have difficulty in
meeting the “previous practice” requirements.52
The CCJ followed the customary track of considering bar input before
adopting Resolution 15 and its policy changes regarding bar admission and
discipline.53 This is poignantly illustrated by the CCJ’s explicit reference to
the ABA House of Delegates’ recent adoption of ABA Resolution 108, or
the Admission by Endorsement (ABE) Resolution.54 Although the CCJ did
not adopt all of the ABE recommendations in Resolution 15, the similarity
in language between ABE and Resolution 15 further evidences the bar’s
influence on the CCJ’s adoption of Resolution 15.55 A review of the ABE
Resolution is helpful to better understand the CCJ’s Resolution 15.
The ABE Resolution most notably “urges state and territorial bar
admission authorities to adopt rules . . . and procedures,” including
admission by endorsement to “accommodate the unique needs of military
spouse attorneys.”56 The ABE’s “admission by endorsement” phrase
means the same thing as Resolution 15’s phrase, “admission without
examination.”
The ABE Resolution requires attorney-spouses to satisfy several other
criteria before gaining bar admission. The additional criteria include a
49. Id.
50. Another condition for admission by motion in many states is reciprocity—that two
states accord each other’s bar members similar admission by motion benefits. The ABA
discourages reciprocity as a requirement for admission by motion. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N
ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 30 (accompanying the model rule for admission by motion).
51. See, e.g., 22 N.Y. CT. APP. R. 520.10 (requiring an attorney to obtain a certificate of
legal education from the New York State Board of Law Examiners as part of admission by
motion).
52. CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 8.
53. See Leubsdorf, supra note 6, at 965.
54. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14.
55. ABE recommendations not in Resolution 15 include: reviewing current bar
application and admission procedures to minimize any burdens on military spouses and to
promptly handle their applications; encouraging mentoring programs to better integrate
military spouse attorneys with the bar; and offering reduced bar application and admission
fees in the lawyer’s new and old jurisdictions. Id.
56. Id.
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requirement that the attorney-spouse demonstrate a presence in the
jurisdiction because of his or her military spouse’s service.57 The attorneyspouse must also establish that the attorney is not currently subject to
lawyer discipline or the subject of a pending disciplinary matter, pay client
protection fund assessments, and comply “with all other ethical, legal and
continuing legal education obligations.”58 The ABE Resolution further
recommends that state admission authorities review bar application
standards and procedures in the hope of facilitating the licensure of military
spouse attorneys.59
The additional ABE criteria, such as the applicant showing that he or she
is not currently subject to lawyer discipline, seem reasonable in light of the
profession’s substantial, if not overriding, interest in protecting the public
from problem lawyers. Interestingly, Resolution 15 does not expressly
incorporate these additional criteria.
One possible explanation for the absence of the additional ABE criteria is
that the CCJ thought it a better strategy to let the states choose which, if
any, additional criteria are appropriate to protect the public’s interest given
the CCJ’s landmark recommendation eliminating examinations for
admission for military spouses. This approach allows state courts to tinker
with the details of Resolution 15’s major doctrinal change, making
Resolution 15 politically more palatable to the states, in part, by appearing
less intrusive in state court regulation. Two broad provisions in Resolution
15 support this explanation and permit states to incorporate additional ABE
criteria. The first one underscores that it is the responsibility of the states’
highest courts to establish a system of admission and regulation for
protecting the public.60 The second provision notes that this responsibility
belongs solely to the states’ highest courts.61 Whatever the reasons for not
including the additional criteria, states are well advised to adopt some or all
of the ABE criteria as additional safeguards for protecting the public from
problem lawyers.
The ABA considered a variety of information in adopting the ABE
Resolution. One key source was the twelve-page report submitted by Mary
Cranston, the chair of the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession.62
The Cranston report incorporates other important sources of information,
for example, Department of Defense (DOD) studies and reports.63 Some of
the information in the Cranston report was reflected in a different report
submitted to the CCJ for its consideration in adopting Resolution 15.64

57. Id. at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Resolution 15, supra note 14.
61. Id.
62. CRANSTON, supra note 22.
63. See id.
64. See supra note 40 (discussing the report before the PCB Committee when it was
considering possible action concerning military dependents who are lawyers).
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There was ample support for the CCJ’s conclusion that military spouse
lawyers face unique licensing problems because of “short-term, compulsory
moves” and that “issues relating to knowledge of local law can be addressed
through a mandatory educational component.”65 Stated differently, the CCJ
decided that the traditional justification for requiring a written examination
for lawyers, specifically to protect the public from unqualified lawyers—in
effect, creating a territorial barrier to entry—was unnecessary for military
spouse lawyers. A number of states have adopted Resolution 15’s
recommendations and admit military spouse lawyers on motion where
examination is generally required for other lawyers.66
Resolution 15 promotes client and public welfare in several ways. First,
Resolution 15 increases the supply of lawyers available to provide legal
services. This increase in lawyer supply, albeit in small number,
nevertheless is a plus for consumer choice and competition in any given
market.
Military spouse lawyers also offer a special type of legal service because
of their unique experiences and insights about military life.67 This special
quality may be attractive to military personnel, their families, and veterans.
A significant percentage of these clients may be from low- or middleincome brackets and unable to obtain legal services. Thus, military spouse
lawyers may promote access to justice for these economically challenged
clients.
Resolution 15 also promotes the public’s interest by protecting the public
from unqualified lawyers by requiring those who waive in to attend a
mandatory educational program that can address any deficiency in
knowledge of local law.68
Resolution 15 also makes it easier for individual military spouse lawyers
to realize a return on their significant investment of time and money in
obtaining a law degree. In general, Resolution 15’s benefits are important
to consumers, the profession, and the courts.
B. Extending Resolution 15’s Reach
Resolution 15’s doctrinal change to eliminate admission by examination
for military spouse lawyers is expressly tied to the “unique licensing . . .
challenges” resulting from compulsory and frequent moves “in support of
the nation’s defense.”69 More important, the doctrinal change is premised
65. Resolution 15, supra note 14; see also supra note 40.
66. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 38(i); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 229; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 719;
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW N.C. R. 0503; S.D. SUP. CT. R. 13-10; TEX.
OCC. CODE ANN. § 55.004 (West 2012).
67. CRANSTON, supra note 22, at 9.
68. Resolution 15, supra note 14.
69. Id. The ABE Resolution language is similar: “[To] accommodate the unique needs
of military spouse attorneys who move frequently in support of the nation’s defense . . . .”
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 14, at 1. State courts will occasionally exempt a certain class of
lawyers from general bar requirements, for example, permitting unlicensed lawyers to
practice law if it is on a pro bono and temporary basis. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 14 (2013); infra note 121 (discussing this trend).
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on the belief that eliminating the examination requirement will not increase
the risk of harm to the public from incompetent or unethical lawyers.70
Resolution 15’s mandate should be extended to all lawyers to eliminate
the need for a written examination for lawyers who cannot meet the
“practice requirements” for admission by motion. This is especially true in
an era of increased lawyer mobility and new technologies that make it
possible for lawyers to relocate across state borders and still serve clients.
There are many lawyers, besides military spouse lawyers, who cannot
meet the practice requirements for admission by motion. These lawyers are
faced with the daunting prospect of taking an onerous written examination
to relocate and hopefully to pursue their profession. A total of 90,973
lawyers graduated from ABA-accredited law schools over a two-year
period from 2011 to 2013.71 None of these graduates would meet the threeyear practice requirement for admission by motion.
Like military spouse lawyers, some of these lawyers may feel compelled
to move at the behest of their employer or to follow a spouse who moved at
the request of an employer. More important, whether the lawyer is seeking
to move to another state voluntarily or not should not be the deciding factor
and overshadow the fact that the lawyer is still facing the same barriers and
related costs to relocation as military spouses, principally, taking a bar
examination.
The benefits of eliminating examinations for military spouse lawyers
who move to another state also apply to nonmilitary spouse lawyers who
move. Nonmilitary-related lawyers who move offer the prospect of
increased competition in another state market, which theoretically should
drive down the cost of legal services. Also, the lawyer who moves to
another state increases consumer choice for legal services. This is
especially true for lawyers who relocate because of their client-employer’s
request. The employer is able to retain its counsel of choice and still realize
70. The CCJ never expressly said military lawyer spouses deserve special treatment and
were entitled to admission by motion even if it meant placing the public at increased risk of
harm.
71. See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES AWARDED 1963–2012 (2013), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admission
s_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.
For illustration
purposes only, assume that for this two-year period, 70 percent of 90,973 or 63,681
graduates passed the bar exam and found full-time legal employment. The 63,681 lawyers
would automatically fall short of the three-year practice requirement under the ABA model
rule and many state rules for admission by motion. If 10 percent of these 63,681 lawyers—
or 6,368—sought to move to another state, they would be facing the cost and time of taking
and hopefully passing another two- to three-day examination. Of course, the illustration’s
numbers could be higher if you consider that many lawyers may not be able to find full-time
employment, especially with today’s difficult job market for law graduates. The
illustration’s numbers do not include additional lawyers who have practiced for more than
three years but were then subsequently laid off from work and found only part-time legal
work. Some of these lawyers may wish to move to a new state and resume full-time legal
employment. They might have difficulty meeting the three years in practice requirement for
admission by motion that would further add to the number of lawyers harmed by the
examination requirement barrier.
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the advantages of having him or her relocate. Some of these lawyers may
possess experience and expertise—for example, an immigration lawyer who
speaks Spanish—that may fill a consumer need for such services. Finally,
like military spouse lawyers, nonmilitary spouse lawyers are able to realize
a return on their investment in their legal education and contribute to
society’s well-being.
Resolution 15 may affect only a very small fraction of the total number
of lawyers in the United States.72 The significance of Resolution 15 lies not
in the number of lawyers it affects but rather in its recognition that
mandatory educational courses about local law sufficiently protect the
public’s interest against incompetent lawyers. It is a de facto recognition
that written examinations that serve as territorial barriers to entry in the
legal services market are unnecessary to protect the public’s interest from
unqualified or unethical lawyers. Resolution 15 expressly acknowledges
that any perceived knowledge deficiency regarding local law and procedure
can be remedied by a less restrictive alternative of requiring a mandatory
education course.
States should follow Resolution 15’s lead and open up the licensure
process to admission by motion for all lawyers, assuming they meet other
additional criteria like some of those identified in ABE—for example, not
being the subject of a pending disciplinary matter. Opening the state
markets to increased lawyer competition by admission by motion provides
significant benefits to consumers and to the individual lawyers with little, if
any, downside. Time will tell whether the CCJ’s break with the
examination tradition will lead to extending the same benefits to
nonmilitary related lawyers but, at the end of the day, territorially based
barriers are unnecessary.
II. SHEDDING THE “BARBARIANS AT THE GATE” SYNDROME:
ALLOWING NONLAWYERS INTO THE CLUB
Even stronger than the territorial barriers that the legal profession has
maintained are the monopolistic barriers it has constructed to defend itself
against incursion by nonlawyers into the delivery of legal services. Now,
however, a growing recognition of the lack of access to justice has led some
in the profession to conceptualize and to implement plans to address the
problem not just by permitting—but also by inviting—nonlawyers to the
table.

72. Less than 1 percent of Americans serve in uniform. WHITE HOUSE, STRENGTHENING
OUR MILITARY FAMILIES: MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 1 (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_initiative/strengthening_our_military_jan
uary_2011.pdf. It is estimated that 10 percent of civilian military spouses have advanced
degrees, of which a law degree is one of many. Id. at 16.
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A. The Great Need: Access to Justice
Some observers believe that the U.S. legal system is one of the best in the
world.73 Many Americans do not share that belief. They are financially
locked out of the legal system—too poor to afford legal assistance for
navigating the system. This lockout, often referred to as the nation’s
“access to justice crisis,”74 is a generally accepted proposition. Many
scholars and others have commented about the longstanding need to
increase access to justice in the United States.75
Statistics underscore the enormity and ever-increasing gap between the
need for, and the availability of, legal services.76 More than 100 million
people in the United States “are living with civil justice problems, many
involving basic human needs” such as retaining housing, employment, and
custody of children.77 Many of these persons never seek assistance for their
73. See TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 51 (2012), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS2012-APPENDICES.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO
CHIEF JUDGE].
74. The phrase “access to justice” may be defined in different ways. Brooks Holland,
The Washington State Limited License Legal Technician Practice Rule: A National First in
Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 75, 78 n.13 (2013). This paper defines “access to
justice” as “the ability of individuals, regardless of financial [circumstances], to access the
resources necessary to participate meaningfully and equally in our system of civil justice. In
our legal system, these resources necessarily include some legal knowledge and training.” Id.
75. For a recent and helpful article discussing the nation’s access to justice crisis, see
Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205 (2014).
Cooper’s article highlights both the enormity and seriousness of the access to justice crisis
quoting several sources. E.g., Alan W. Houseman, The Future of Civil Legal Aid: Initial
Thoughts, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 265, 265 (2010) (“[E]qual justice is not a reality for
millions of Americans[,] . . . particularly . . . low-income Americans who do not have
meaningful access to legal information, advice, assistance, or actual representation in
court.”). In Access to Justice Without Lawyers, Cooper examines three ways to increase
access to justice, including the licensing of nonlawyers to provide legal services. See
generally Cooper, supra. This Article builds upon Access to Justice Without Lawyers and
other works to argue that the Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision authorizing
nonlawyers to deliver limited legal services represents a significant crack in the profession’s
monopoly over the delivery of legal services. E.g., Holland, supra note 74; see DEBORAH L.
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3 (2004); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers As Citizens, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009). Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of the New York Court
of Appeals is a leading voice concerning access to justice who is not from the academy. See
REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 51 (“[E]qual justice is fundamental to our society,
and something . . . [that] differentiates our country from others . . . in the world[;] . . . access
to justice is not a luxury in good times [but is] something that now more than ever, given
what is going on in . . . our country is so necessary.”).
76. See Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101–03 (reporting a recent “renaissance” of
empirical and other “research investigating the delivery of legal services and public
experience with civil justice,” including a 2012 commitment by the Legal Services
Corporation to use “robust assessment tools,” as well as the American Bar Foundation’s
establishment in 2010 of an Access to Justice research initiative, and a 2010 Access to
Justice Initiative by the Department of Justice; providing an excellent research agenda that
includes “how current definitions and understandings of access to justice may blind policy
makers to more radical, but potentially more effective, solutions”).
77. REBECCA L. SANDEFUR, AM. BAR FOUND. & UNIV. OF ILLINOIS AT URBANACHAMPAIGN, CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS AND PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING 1 (n.d.), available at
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problems from a lawyer or a court; one recent study reports only “14% of
civil justice problems were taken to a court or hearing body.”78 Although
only a modest 14 percent seek court access for assistance with their civil
justice problems, it still creates a significant burden for the courts and
system.79 This is because an ever-increasing number of these cases that
make it to court involve pro se litigants who present special challenges for
lawyers and judges as they attempt to efficiently and justly resolve
disputes.80
The legal assistance system in the United States is diverse and
fragmented, the product of outputs of many public-private partnerships,
most of them small scale.81 States and communities differ in terms of
resources available to fund legal services.82 They also differ in terms of
offering different services to different populations.83 There is little
coordination among the various service providers, making it difficult for the
needy to contact the provider who can help.84 The diversity and
fragmentation creates large inequalities between states, and within them,
over what legal services are available to which populations.85 This further

http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/sandefur_-_civil_legal_
needs_and_public_legal_understanding_handout.pdf; see also REBECCA L. SANDEFUR &
AARON C. SMYTH, AM. BAR FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA, at v (2011), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/access_across_
america_first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_project.pdf (providing the
first state-by-state portrait of available services to assist citizens to access civil justice).
78. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 1–2 (noting that most Americans do not consider taking
their problems to lawyers or the courts as the most common reason for not seeking
assistance, and that a study found that in Great Britain a significant percentage of persons
sought legal assistance when they perceived their problem as legal, and not a social, moral,
or private matter).
79. See, e.g., Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice:
Meeting the Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 42 (2002);
Vincent Morris, Navigating Justice: Self-Help Resources, Access to Justice, and Whose Job
Is It Anyway?, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 161, 165 (2013) (“The increasing number of unprepared
self-represented litigants is causing a strain on court resources, resulting in congestion and
delays within the court system.”).
80. See Paula J. Frederick, Learning To Live with Pro Se Opponents, GPSOLO, Oct.–
Nov. 2005, at 48, 50 (reporting that lawyers often complain about the “headaches” of dealing
with pro se litigants); see also Morris, supra note 79. For example, pro se litigants,
sometimes referred to as unrepresented litigants, are generally unfamiliar with the law and
court rules. This may delay or prevent dispute resolution. See Benita Pearson, Judge, U.S.
Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ohio, Panel Remarks at University of Akron School of Law
Symposium: Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of Ethics 20/20: Globalization,
New Technologies, and What It Means to be a Lawyer in These Uncertain Times (Apr. 5,
2013) (transcript on file with the author) (reporting a noticeable increase in the number of
pro se cases and that this development presents challenges for the judge).
81. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 2; SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 9.
82. SANDEFUR, supra note 77, at 2; SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 2 (noting that
the most recent survey, now twenty years old, “of low- and middle-income households in the
U.S. found that about half of the households were experiencing at least one problem that had
civil legal aspects . . . and [that] was potentially actionable under civil law”).
83. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 12.
84. Id. at 21.
85. Id. at 9.
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complicates access to justice for many and places a premium on the location
rather than the nature of the request for legal services.86
More than 80 percent of the legal needs of the poor87 and 67 percent of
the legal needs of middle-income Americans go unmet.88 Traditional
methods of providing access to justice for these people are inadequate given
the magnitude of the need.89 The vast need dwarfs the positive
contributions of publicly funded legal aid and charitable-based
organizations, pro bono efforts, and law school clinics—all of which are
facing their own financial challenges in these difficult economic times.90
New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman recently
described the cuts to funding for civil legal services at the national level as
“devastat[ing].”91 He further noted that support for legal services at the
state level is also under stress. Funds from New York’s Interest on Lawyer
Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program that helps finance some legal services for
the poor plummeted from $36 million to $6 million.92 New York’s
experience is not unique; many states are experiencing decreases in IOLTA
funds.93

86. Id. (observing that “[i]n this context, geography is destiny:” physical location and
not the problems or services needed by the population determines the available legal
assistance).
87. Cooper, supra note 75, at 205; see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS
14–15 (2005), available at http://www.mlac.org/pdf/Documenting-the-Justice-Gap.pdf; AM.
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED
SITUATIONS 77 (1995) (reporting that between 70 and 80 percent of the poor’s legal needs
are unmet); Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 76, at 110 (“Studying access to justice by
focusing only on the poor . . . limits our understanding of the relationship between legal
services and inequality. In the United States, access to justice is often treated as an aspect of
anti-poverty policy, which belies the fact that we know surprisingly little about inequalities
in access to civil justice.”).
88. RHODE, supra note 75, at 3; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 205–06; see also Alex J.
Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241, 2241
(1999) (asserting that “many moderate-income households” are unable to access the justice
system). Although the poor may be the most significant group concerning the unmet need
for legal services, other population groups are eligible for aid, including approximately 55
million elderly, 2.5 million American Indians, over 22 million veterans, over 600,000
homeless people, more than 36 million people with disabilities, and more than 1 million
people with HIV/AIDS. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10.
89. Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of Testimony Before the Task Force To Expand Access
to Civil Legal Services in New York, RICHARD ZORZA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG 1 (Oct. 1,
2012),
http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/hadfield-testimony-october-2012final-2.pdf; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 205–09 (arguing that this scenario requires
fundamental change in the way that the judiciary regulates the practice of law); see also
Rhode, supra note 75, at 1330–31.
90. Hadfield, supra note 89; see Cooper, supra note 75, at 206.
91. REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 50; see also infra notes 94–98 and
accompanying text (discussing national funding for civil legal services).
92. REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, at 50.
93. See, e.g., Cliff Collins, Leading the Way, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 2011, at 21, 22;
Janet Eveleth, Interest Rate Drop Hurts IOLTA, MD. B. BULL. (Apr. 2009),
http://www.msba.org/departments/commpubl/publications/bar_bult/2009/april/interestratedr
ops.asp; IOLTA Grant Information, IDAHO L. FOUND., http://www.isb.idaho.gov/ilf/iolta/
grants.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); see also Morris, supra note 79, at 165 (predicting an
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There is little prospect of a massive injection of governmental money to
fund legal services for the poor.94 The trend seems to be in the opposite
direction. Congressional funding for legal aid from the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) in fiscal year 2012 was reduced again from a total of
$348 million to under $341 million.95
Some argue that allocating additional money for legal services alone will
not resolve the access to justice crisis. For example, in 2012, Professor
Gillian Hadfield testified before New York’s Task Force to Expand Access
to Civil Legal Services in New York.96 She emphasized that the kind of
legal services that ordinary New Yorkers need cannot be addressed by
merely increasing the expenditure of public funds.97 She observed that the
scale of the problem is too large—the legal services demand far outstrips
both publicly funded and charitable supplies of lawyers’ services.98
Instead, Hadfield argued that a fundamental restructuring of the deliveryof-legal-services market is necessary to allow nonlawyers to deliver certain
lower-cost legal services.99 Lawyers are too expensive for many low- and
middle-income persons and the government cannot afford to subsidize
enough lawyers to resolve the access to justice crisis.100
Opening the legal services market to nonlawyers may seem like a radical
proposal. Hadfield points to nurse practitioners in the medical field as an
example of how lower-cost service providers have helped narrow that
industry’s demand-supply gap.101 Hadfield argues that the legal profession
needs to find nonlawyers to deliver lower-cost legal services and notes that

increase in unrepresented or pro se litigants because “federal funding . . . [IOLTA] grants,
and state financial support continues to decrease for many free legal services and pro bono
organizations”).
94. The enormity of the kind of injection needed is highlighted by the fact that almost 57
million people were eligible for free legal services in 2009 according to a 2010 financial
means test created by the federal Legal Services Corporation—the central funder of civil
legal assistance in the United States. SANDEFUR & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10. Under the
2010 means test, a family of four making $27,641 or less would qualify for legal assistance.
Id.
95. LSC Funding, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/lsc-funding (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014). In 1974, Congress established the LSC to “fund . . . 134 independent
nonprofit legal-aid programs in every state, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.”
Press Release, Legal Servs. Corp., Funding Cuts Expected To Result in Nearly 750 Fewer
Staff Positions at LSC-funded Programs (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.lsc.gov/
media/press-releases/funding-cuts-expected-result-nearly-750-fewer-staff-positions-lscfunded (reporting that an LSC survey showed that “local legal aid programs expect to reduce
staffing by nearly 750 employees in 2012, including 350 attorneys, because of funding cuts .
. . represent[ing] a reduction of eight percent of full-time-equivalent (FTE) positions from
the end of 2011”); see Morris, supra note 79, at 165 (citing the above LSC press release
regarding staff reductions and contending that this “will likely continue [the] increase in the
volume of self-represented litigation”).
96. Hadfield, supra note 89, at 1.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2–3.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 4.

2014] CRACKS IN THE PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY ARMOR

2653

Washington has already decided to do this and that other states are
considering similar action.102
The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education (Task Force)
recently echoed the concerns of Hadfield and others that many low- and
middle-income populations cannot afford to hire lawyers and embraced the
idea of nonlawyers delivering legal services. The Task Force noted that
there are rarely alternatives to obtaining legal assistance other than from
fully trained lawyers who have passed the bar.103 These populations will
remain underserved because lawyers are unavailable to these clients unless
the government or a private benefactor subsidizes their services—an
unlikely prospect, especially in these difficult economic times.104
The ABA Task Force reported that the high cost of lawyers’ services
“has facilitated the use (or proposed use)” of nonlawyers “to deliver lowercost legal services,” including issuing limited licenses to deliver categories
of legal services.105 Moreover, the ABA Task Force recommended to state
regulators of law practice to authorize nonlawyers to provide limited legal
services, either by licensing systems or other mechanisms ensuring proper
education, training, and oversight.106 This recommendation reflects the
new momentum for resolving the access to justice crisis by opening the
legal services market to nonlawyers, especially in light of recent
developments in Washington.
B. Washington’s Limited License Legal Technicians Rule—Enhancing
Consumer Welfare?
On June 15, 2012, a divided Washington Supreme Court issued a
landmark order, the new APR 28.107 For the first time in the nation’s
history, a state’s high court opened the market for the delivery of legal
services to nonlawyers—a new professional class of legal service providers

102. Id. at 5–6.
103. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., DRAFT REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/taskforcecomments/task_force_on_legaleducation
_draft_report_september2013.authcheckdam.pdf. The primary focus of the ABA Task
Force’s draft report concerned the urgent problems confronting the U.S. legal education
system and the diminished public confidence in the system. Id.
104. Id.; see REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE, supra note 73, 56 (stating that “millions of New
Yorkers today cannot meaningfully protect their rights because they can’t afford to hire an
attorney” and acknowledging that “two point three million mostly low income New Yorkers
are unrepresented in civil proceedings . . . every year” (emphasis added)).
105. AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note 103, at 12–
13. The ABA Task Force acknowledged that the cost of a lawyer is unaffordable for many
low- and some middle-income persons even though the supply of lawyers may exceed
demand in some sectors of the economy. Id.
106. Id. at 30–31. The Task Force also recommended that they commit to establishing
uniform national standards for admission to practice as a lawyer. Id. at 30.
107. The vote was six to three. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule
for Limited License Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (Wash. June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A1005.pdf.
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titled limited license law technicians.108 LLLTs can open a professional
practice giving some legal advice and assistance directly to clients without
lawyer supervision—a radical paradigm shift because lawyer supervision is
generally a prerequisite for nonlawyer legal services work. This judicially
authorized incursion into the profession’s monopoly over legal services,
albeit in one state, is still very new and its impact is an open question.109
APR 28, however, has attracted significant attention from other states110
and scholars and it promises to be an important part of the ongoing dialogue
addressing the access to justice problem.111
The Washington Supreme Court highlighted the state’s “wide and evergrowing gap in necessary legal . . . services for low and moderate income
persons.”112 In issuing APR 28, the court also described Washington’s
108. Holland, supra note 74, at 91. The court also established an LLLT board to oversee
the implementation of the LLLT program. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(C); see also
Kristen Kyle-Castelli, Foreword, Poverty Access to Justice Symposium, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA,
at i, iii (2013) (describing APR 28 as “Washington’s pioneering [LLLT] rule”). See
generally Amy Yarbrough, Limited-Practice License Idea Faces Challenging Path, CAL.
B.J. (May 2013), http://www.calbarjournal.com/May2013/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the California Bar studied the idea of licensing legal technicians
as did the American Bar Association in the mid-nineties. Id. The studies supported the idea
but the licensure never occurred. Id.
109. See Yarbrough, supra note 108. Robert Hawley, deputy executive director of the
California Bar, stressed that for years in the legal services marketplace, “the supply of
lawyers has risen, the demand for legal services has risen and the cost of legal services has
risen. ‘Under the economic laws of supply and demand, this is not possible . . . . It can
occur only in a monopoly and perhaps it is time for lawyers to give up their monopoly on the
practice of law.’” Id. (emphasis added).
110. In January 2013, California’s State Bar Board of Trustees expressed an interest in a
limited-practice law licensing program, with one trustee stating that many consumers cannot
afford market rates for a lawyer’s service. Laura Ernde, State Bar To Look at LimitedPractice Licensing Program, CAL. B.J. (Feb. 2013), http://www.calbarjournal.com/
February2013/TopHeadlines/TH1.aspx. Assistant State Chief Trial Counsel Dane Dauphine
reported that the state bar receives annually hundreds of complaints about the occurrence of
UPL. Id. State Bar Executive Director Hawley noted that what constitutes the practice of
law involves some difficult line drawing but “interpreting legal authorities and customizing
them to fit a consumer’s specific needs does invoke the practice of law, at least
theoretically.” Id. Another trustee urged his colleagues to examine Washington’s LLLT
program because many persons in California are forced to turn to unregulated nonlawyers to
address the public’s need for legal services. Id.; see Press Release, Laura Ernde, State Bar
Group To Hold Public Meeting on Limited-Practice Licensing (Apr. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/News/Archives/2013NewsReleases/201306.aspx
(reporting that the Limited License Working Group, involving a number of trustees and
California Bar President Patrick M. Kelly, will review similar programs in Washington and
Canada as a way to increase access to affordable legal services and protect the public). At an
April hearing of the California Bar’s Limited License Working Group, Washington State Bar
Executive Director Littlewood described the state’s adoption of APR 28 as “a 10-year, pretty
hard-fought battle” to permit nonlawyers to provide limited legal services to clients. See
Yarbrough, supra note 108. Littlewood stated that “consumer protection is one of the
‘highest ideals’ of her state’s program” and “cited figures indicating that eighty-five percent
of indigent . . . families . . . are not being served anyway.” Id. “The needs of the consuming
public have never been ‘one size fits all’ . . . . There is so much work to go around. How
can you take it away from people?’” Id.; see also Hadfield, supra note 89.
111. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 75; Holland, supra note 74.
112. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005 (stating that the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study indicated
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adversarial civil legal system as “complex [and] unaffordable,” placing
many pro se litigants at a disadvantage and “forcing [them] to seek help
from unregulated, untrained, and unsupervised ‘practitioners.’”113 The
court and advocates of APR 28 hope that LLLTs will narrow the gap
between the public’s ever-increasing need for legal assistance and available
resources.114
The Washington Supreme Court also noted a particular need for legal
assistance in the family relations area in part because it is governed by a
myriad of statutes.115 “[T]housands of unrepresented (pro se) individuals
seek to resolve important” matters in court and are unable to obtain legal
assistance “from an overtaxed, underfunded civil legal aid system.”116
As a result, the court subsequently approved regulations that became
effective September 3, 2013, authorizing domestic relations as the first
practice area for LLLTs.117 The regulations permit LLLTs, without the
that 85 percent of indigent families’ legal needs were not being served). APR 28 was first
submitted by the Washington Supreme Court’s Practice of Law Board in 2008 and revised in
2012 after many comments. Id. at 1. The majority of the Washington Supreme Court noted
in its order that “the 2003 Civil Legal Needs Study documented moderate income people
[too] (defined as families with incomes between 200% and 400% of the Federal Poverty
Level).” See Telephone Interview with Steve Crossland, Chair of LLLT Board (Oct. 11,
2013).
113. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005. The Washington Supreme Court’s description of its civil
legal system is likely applicable to other states.
114. The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education is one recent, albeit
unexpected, advocate of the principle underlying Washington’s decision to license
nonlawyers. See AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., supra note
103, at 12–13 (reporting that “[t]he relatively high cost of the services of lawyers has
facilitated the use (or proposed use) of persons who have not received a J.D. to deliver
lower-cost legal services” and noting that changes are under way like in Washington with
APR 28 to create “systems of limited licenses to deliver categories of legal service by
persons who are not lawyers admitted to practice”).
115. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005.
116. Id. The serious issues and enormous unmet need for legal assistance in the family
relations field is a national problem. For a recent discussion highlighting the inability of
legal aid to handle the increasing number of requests for legal assistance concerning family
law matters in Cleveland, see Kari White et al., Pro Se Divorce and Pro Se “Plus” Divorce
Clinics—Helping Families Move On, CLEVELAND METRO. B.J., July/Aug. 2013, at 6, 38.
“Legal aid is unable to help many of the individuals who need assistance with divorce and
other family law matters.” Id. at 38. As a result, many low-income individuals go without
legal assistance with potentially profound consequences, including forcing some to “remain
married to their spouse for many years, unable to navigate the maze of court pleadings and
courtroom procedures.” Id. For some individuals, this means
they cannot adequately prepare for the future, because surviving spouses have
certain rights that cannot be defeated by a will. For others, it may mean that they
are the presumptive parent of a child who is not their biological child—a legal
presumption that carries with it a variety of additional obligations, including the
obligation to support the minor child.
Id. The article emphasizes that “[t]he Domestic Relations Court urgently needs help in
properly processing Pro Se divorce cases, which are on the upswing.” Id. at 39.
117. In commenting on the need for help in the domestic relations area in its APR 28
order, the court further noted: “Legal practice [in family relations] must conform to specific
statewide and local procedures [and involve] standard forms developed at both the statewide
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supervision of lawyers, to “advise and assist clients (1) to initiate and
respond to actions and (2) regarding motions, discovery, trial preparation,
temporary and final orders, and modifications of orders” in domestic
relations.118
The LLLT services permitted in the domestic relations area would
generally constitute the practice of law in most states; this would be true for
Washington too except for LLLT licensure.119 Nonlawyers who provide
legal “advice and assistance” without the supervision of a lawyer would be
subject to prosecution under state UPL statutes.120 UPL laws are designed
to protect the public, the profession, and courts from incompetent or
otherwise unscrupulous legal service providers. UPL laws are also seen by
some as a construct for limiting competition from nonlawyers and
unlicensed lawyers delivering legal services.121
Washington’s LLLT program promises more affordable legal services. It
also promises to protect consumers from harm. The Washington Supreme
Court made the public’s interest its lodestar in issuing APR 28. “[T]he
basis of any regulatory scheme including our exercise of the exclusive
authority to determine who can practice law . . . , must start and end with
the public interest . . . ensur[ing] that those who provide legal and law
related service have the education, knowledge, skills and abilities to do
so.”122 Washington State Bar Executive Director Paula Littlewood
similarly emphasized that protecting the public is one of the bar’s “highest

and local levels.” In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License
Legal Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005. The Washington Supreme Court approved
domestic relations as the first LLLT practice area in March 2013. The LLLT board is
currently receiving expressions of interest in the LLLT program since the domestic relations
area rules became effective on September 3, 2013. See Interview with Steve Crossland,
supra note 112.
118. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28 reg. app. 2:B2.
119. See, e.g., Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Davie, 977 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Ohio 2012)
(holding that a paralegal who helped prepare litigation forms for child custody performed the
unauthorized practice of law).
120. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 79 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that a
paralegal who gave advice to clients regarding bankruptcy matters engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law); People v. Milner, 35 P.3d 670, 686 (Colo. 2001) (holding that
a paralegal who met with a client at an initial interview without an attorney’s oversight and
advised the client to seek temporary custody of the client’s children and not to discuss the
children’s welfare with social services engaged in unauthorized practice of law).
121. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 247–48 (1988) (arguing,
in part, that the enforcement of UPL laws “prop[s] up legal fees” without promoting any
other important public good). The public protection rationale for UPL laws is questionable.
For example, in Missouri, there is a special rule that allows unlicensed lawyers to practice if
their work qualifies as pro bono. If the UPL rationale is to protect the public from
unqualified or at least locally unregulated lawyers, then why place pro bono clients—
perhaps some of society’s more vulnerable clients—in harm’s way? One could argue that
the Missouri UPL rule is really more about restricting competition from lawyers not licensed
in Missouri for clients who can pay for legal services than protecting the public. Missouri’s
pro bono exception to its UPL rule places pro bono clients at risk of harm by permitting
unlicensed Missouri lawyers to provide them with legal services. MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.105.
122. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005.
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ideals” when discussing APR 28 before a California bar committee
considering nonlawyer legal service providers.123
Washington’s LLLT program appears to accomplish the state supreme
court’s goal of protecting the public, in part, by requiring significant
educational and experiential qualifications. These requirements provide
assurances to the judiciary and the public that LLLTs possess adequate
educational and experiential skills for acting as fiduciaries and delivering
legal services—essentially practicing law in a limited capacity.124
LLLT applicants must have an associate of arts (AA) degree.125 They
must also complete the LLLT core education requirement of forty-five
credit hours in basic courses, such as contracts, civil procedure, and
The core education requirement also
professional responsibility.126
includes eight credit hours of legal research and writing—important skills
courses.127 LLLT applicants can apply the forty-five credit hours of core
LLLT courses towards earning their AA degree, generally a degree program
that is two years or a total of sixty semester credit hours.128 “This will
make the LLLT education even more affordable.”129

123. See Yarbrough, supra note 108. Littlewood stated that “consumer protection is one
of the ‘highest ideals’ of her state’s program” and “cited figures indicating that 85 percent of
indigent . . . families . . . are not being served anyway.” Id.
124. Qualifications for taking the licensing application were amended on July 14, 2013.
APR 28 requires applicants to be eighteen years old and to demonstrate good character and
fitness to practice as an LLLT. One also needs the following: “an associate level
degree . . . ;” forty-five credits of core education requirements in legal studies at an ABAapproved law school or ABA-approved paralegal program; practice area courses in each
practice area the applicant wishes to be licensed; and “3,000 hours of substantive law-related
work experience.” WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28.
125. Id.
126. The Washington curriculum regulations read as follows:
A. Core Curriculum. An applicant for licensure shall have earned the following
course credits at an ABA approved law school or ABA approved paralegal
program:
1. Civil Procedure, minimum 8 credits;
2. Contracts, minimum 3 credits;
3. Interviewing and Investigation Techniques, minimum 3 credits;
4. Introduction to Law and Legal Process, minimum 3 credits;
5. Law Office Procedures and Technology, minimum 3 credits;
6. Legal Research, Writing and Analysis, minimum 8 credits; and
7. Professional Responsibility, minimum 3 credits.
The core curriculum courses in which credit is earned shall satisfy the curricular
requirements approved by the Board and published by the WSBA. If the
required core curriculum courses completed by the applicant do not total 45
credits as required by APR 28D(3)(b), then the applicant may earn the
remaining credits by taking legal or paralegal elective courses at an ABA
approved law school or ABA approved paralegal program.
Id. R. 28 app. reg. 3(A).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3333-1-04(C)(6) (2010) (listing the standards for
approval of associate degree programs and requiring a minimum of sixty semester credits).
An LLLT applicant is not required to earn an AA degree before enrolling in LLLT courses;
both can be accomplished simultaneously. For example, an applicant “may obtain an AA
degree in paralegal studies which includes completion of the 45 [core] credits.” See E-mail
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In addition to satisfactory completion of the core, the LLLT applicant
must complete the “practice area curriculum requirements.”130 In the
domestic relations practice area, an applicant must take a total of fifteen
credit hours of domestic relations, with five of those credits in basic
domestic relations subjects and another “ten credit hours in advanced and
Washington specific domestic relations subjects.”131 This intensive
concentration in family law strongly suggests LLLT graduates are more
knowledgeable about domestic relations than their law school counterparts,
who may take one general family law course. In the law school curriculum,
family law is typically a three–credit hour elective course.132
The LLLT board and Washington’s three law schools are collaborating to
provide the family law courses.133 The family law courses will be offered
by a law school faculty member and probably at a law school.134 The
courses will be available online at state community colleges and accessible
from home.135 The easy access for the courses is in line with what one
LLLT board member described as a three-prong approach, or the “Three
As”: affordability, accessibility, and academic rigor.136
There should be a ready supply of recent community and baccalaureate
college graduates who may find the LLLT career attractive, especially in
these difficult economic times.137 LLLTs acquire professional status and
from Thea Jennings, Ltd. License Legal Technician Program Lead, Regulatory Servs. Dep’t,
Wash. State Bar Ass’n, to author (Dec. 3, 2013, 14:40 EST) (on file with author).
129. See E-mail from Thea Jennings, supra note 128.
130. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28 app. reg. 3(B).
131. The Washington regulations state:
B. Practice Area Curriculum. An applicant for licensure in a defined practice area
shall have completed the prescribed curriculum and earned course credits for that
defined practice area, as set forth below and in APR 28D(3)(c). Each practice area
curriculum course shall satisfy the curricular requirements approved by the Board
and published by the WSBA.
1. Domestic Relations.
a. Prerequisites: Prior to enrolling in the domestic relations practice
area courses, applicants shall complete the following core courses:
Civil Procedure; Interviewing and Investigation Techniques;
Introduction to Law and Legal Process; Legal Research, Writing,
and Analysis; and Professional Responsibility.
b. Credit Requirements: Applicants shall complete five credit hours
in basic domestic relations subjects and ten credit hours in
advanced and Washington specific domestic relations subjects.
Id.
132. See, e.g., Family Law: Course Description, NYU L., http://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/
description.cfm?id=11325 (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
133. See Interview with Steve Crossland, supra note 112.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. The U.S. Department of Education reported that in 2010, 41.6 percent or 379,425 of
the twenty-five- to thirty-four-year-olds in Washington held some kind of postsecondary
degree (e.g., AA). It estimates that percentage will increase to 60 to 62 percent or between
655,000 and 676,000 by 2020. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New State-by-State
College Attainment Numbers Show Progress Toward 2020 Goal (July 12, 2012), available
at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new-state-state-college-attainment-numbers-showprogress-toward-2020-goal; cf. Donna Gordon Blankinship, Number of College Grads Drops
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the ability to earn a living, either independently, or as an employee of a
private or governmental entity. For example, LLLTs might work for a
social services agency or a law firm. Law firms may find LLLTs attractive
hires because, unlike paralegals and legal assistants, LLLTs will be able to
assume more complete and direct responsibility for certain aspects of client
matters—for example, advising clients on the selection of forms and how to
respond to interrogatories. This should free lawyers to focus on other
important aspects of practicing law, such as directly negotiating contracts or
settling claims with opposing parties and participating in hearings and
trials.138 One expert on Washington’s LLLT rule noted that “[n]ot
surprisingly, we have found that some forward-looking lawyers are
considering how employing or working with LLLTs may fit into their
business model.”139
C. LLLTs: Some Concerns
Some critics of LLLTs fear that they may be more likely to harm the
public by committing fraud or engaging in unethical conduct.140 Like
lawyers, there is no guarantee that LLLTs will avoid such offenses.
However, LLLTs will be subject to an ethics code and a disciplinary regime
that is modeled after the state’s lawyer disciplinary system with presumably
similar consequences for violating professional norms.141 LLLTs are
already subject to Washington’s attorney-client evidentiary privilege and its
lawyer fiduciary obligations.142

in Washington, 14 Other States; Recession Blamed, SEATTLE TIMES (July 12, 2012, 9:30
PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/education/2018675041_collegedegrees13.html (reporting
that the recession and state cuts in higher education dollars were partly to blame for the drop
in the number of college degrees held by twenty-five- to thirty-five-year-olds but that
Washington still ranked fifteenth in the nation for college attainment).
138. See generally Rachel Zahorsky & William D. Henderson, Who’s Eating Law Firm’s
Lunch?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2013, at 33, 33 (highlighting the need to deliver legal services in an
efficient manner and discussing how legal services companies are more efficiently
performing some legal services by, for example, “review[ing], manag[ing,] and analyz[ing]
documents for large-scale litigation” than law firms).
139. See E-mail from Thea Jennings, Ltd. License Legal Technician Program Lead,
Regulatory Servs. Dep’t, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, to author (Dec. 10, 2013, 15:38 EST) (on
file with author). The LLLT board recently considered possible business relationships for
LLLTs while drafting LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct. The LLLT board concluded
that LLLTs may not form business relationships with nonlawyers. For example, companies
like Wal-Mart could not own and operate a chain of LLLTs. See id. However, at its
November 2013 LLLT board meeting, the board approved joint ownership of firms with
lawyers, provided that LLLTs (i) may not direct a lawyer’s professional judgment, (ii) have
direct supervisory authority over a lawyer, or (iii) possess a majority interest or exercise
controlling managerial authority in a firm. Id. It is important to note that such an LLLT
provision is subject to further review by the LLLT board or state bar association and would
only become effective upon additional review and approval by the Washington Supreme
Court. Id.
140. See Yarbrough, supra note 108.
141. See Interview with Steve Crossland, supra note 112 (stating that an LLLT board
committee is working on an ethics code and determining which lawyer ethics rules are
transferable to LLLTs).
142. See WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(K)(3); Holland, supra note 74, at 112.
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Another concern regarding LLLTs involves their ability to earn sufficient
income from their limited type of law practice. The fear expressed by some
is that LLLTs may “not find the practice lucrative and that the cost of
establishing and maintaining [an LLLT] practice . . . will require them to
charge rates close to attorneys”—which ultimately would not increase
access to justice.143
The legal services market should deter LLLTs from charging rates near
or at the same amount as lawyers. When the rates become similar,
consumers will presumably hire lawyers given their ability to provide a
fuller range of legal services—for example, appearing before tribunals. The
ability of lawyers to offer a wider array of legal services should keep LLLT
fees significantly below lawyer rates.
Whether LLLTs can find the legal services market sufficiently lucrative
to sustain their practice is an important and open question. There are
reasons to believe that LLLTs can survive economically and still offer
affordable legal services.
First, LLLT’s may serve a broader population than just low- to middleincome persons. Even if that is not the case, the unmet need or potential
demand for LLLT services is high. Washington State Bar Executive
Director Littlewood cited “figures indicating that 85 percent of indigent . . .
families . . . are not being served” and asserted that “‘[t]he needs of the
consuming public have never been ‘one size fits all’ . . . . There is so much
work to go around. How can you take it away from people?’”144
Second, LLLTs probably will not have the high debt burden that afflicts
many law graduates. An LLLT graduate at a minimum will have to fund
forty-five core credits and another fifteen credits in a practice area
curriculum specialty. All or some of these credits can be applied to the
LLLT applicant’s completion of the required two-year AA degree.145
In contrast, a law graduate will have at least invested approximately
twice as much—and probably much more—time and money as an LLLT,
attending both a four-year baccalaureate program and then three years of
law school. The average law student today graduates with a $77,728 debt
burden.146 The prospect of LLLTs earning sufficient money in their
practice is enhanced by virtue of not having to pay down a high education
debt like many law graduates and other professionals.
Third, there is an important lesson to be learned from the growing
number of legal vendors or services companies assisting large corporate
clients or law firms, for example, in managing and reviewing their
documents. “[T]echnology and law are the wave of the future.”147 The
143. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005, slip op. at 8 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf.
144. See Yarbrough, supra note 108.
145. See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3333-1-04 (2010).
146. Statistics, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
statistics.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
147. Zahorsky & Henderson, supra note 138, at 35.
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market is “developing even more concentrated engines of efficiency and
scale.”148 Technology may provide—if it has not already—the means for
LLLTs to realize economic success.149
There is another related issue about the economics of LLLT practice that
concerns equal justice. Some observers fear that the creation of LLLTs
creates a two-tier justice system. One tier would be for the poor who rely
on the more affordable and limited services of LLLTs, which might be, or
at least is perceived as, inferior. A second tier would be for more affluent
persons who would rely on lawyers, a more educated and versatile group of
legal services providers. Unlike LLLTs, lawyers can engage in direct
negotiations with opposing parties and appear before adjudicatory bodies.
Professor Brooks Holland provides an excellent discussion of the equal
justice concern.150 He notes that the LLLT service is not inequitable simply
because it offers a service at a better price.151 He cites the medical
profession and nurse practitioners as a poignant example of less costly
service providers who have become a “more widely used, professionalized,
and respected component of the health care market.”152 Holland ultimately
concludes that even if the “competitive market vision” for LLLTs does
materialize as its proponents hope, then a more pragmatic approach should
govern the debate about “equal-justice concerns.” “[M]ore exceeds less in
the real world,”153 and if the LLLT program results in something less than
equal justice but instead “‘adequate access to justice,” then that is positive
achievement.154
CONCLUSION
The assault continues on the profession’s monopoly of the legal services
market. Various market forces, including advances in technology making
access to legal services more readily available to the public; pressure from
corporate and other clients to lower the cost of legal services, cutting into
lawyers’ profit margins; global competition from lawyers and nonlawyers
to provide legal assistance; and an oversupply of lawyers have compelled
the profession to change its mode of doing business. As a result, the
profession has already discarded, voluntarily or involuntarily, some of its

148. Id. (quoting Professor Oliver Goodenough of Vermont Law School). Goodenough
further notes “that the traditional law firm ‘is no longer the best game in town for delivering
high-quality legal service through scaling and flexibility. Rather . . . new [technology]
service companies’” provide this kind of service. Id.
149. Id. at 38 (“[A] technology-driven revolution is overturning how America practices
law, runs its government and dispenses justice.” (quoting Professor Goodenough)).
150. See Holland, supra note 74, at 118–27.
151. Id. at 124.
152. Id. at 125 (citing Jay S. Markowitz, Letter to the Editor, I Am Your Nurse. Please
Call Me ‘Doctor,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2011, at A26).
153. Id. at 128.
154. Id. (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to
Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 61 (2003)).
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Byzantine rules of self-regulation crafted under the banner of protecting the
public but more often serving the profession’s self-interests.155
Resolution 15 and Washington’s LLLT rule also represent significant
changes for the profession in the delivery of legal services. They both
enhance competition, but they will do so in different ways.
Resolution 15 promotes competition from within the bar by facilitating
movement of lawyers from one territorial market to another. For now, such
movement is limited to the dependents of service members, a relatively
small percentage of the bar. This small number should nevertheless not
overshadow the significance of their being free from geographical restraints
to earn a livelihood and offer the public additional service providers. More
important, the CCJ has officially recognized that it is still possible to protect
the public and simultaneously strike down these barriers by requiring
moving lawyers to acquire knowledge of local law through mandatory
education programs.156
There is no reason why the same safeguard cannot work for other
lawyers. Resolution 15’s mandate to further lawyer mobility for military
spouse lawyers should be extended to the entire bar, given the potential
economic and other benefits to lawyers, their families, and the public.
Washington’s LLLT rule promotes competition from professionals—
nonlawyer technicians—who are outside the bar. For the first time,
consumers have the opportunity to obtain legal assistance from nonlawyers
free from lawyer supervision and related surcharges for such oversight. The
nonlawyer service should cost less than retaining a lawyer for the same
service. More important, it should open access to justice for many
Americans.
Also, LLLTs may offer another benefit. Like Jeffersonian notions of
democracy, having more persons participate in the economy and the legal
system—in this case, LLLTs and hopefully some of those who previously
have not accessed the justice system—is a good thing for the profession and
society.157

155. See WOLFRAM, supra note 1, at 776 (noting that the desire of some in the bar to
control competition played a role in the profession’s resistance to advertising).
156. Another important safeguard not expressly stated in Resolution 15 is to make certain
that the moving lawyers are in good standing in the profession; for example, there are no
pending disciplinary investigations. This important qualification may be subsumed in
another provision of Resolution 15. It recognizes that “state bar admission authorities and
state supreme courts remain responsible for making admission decisions and enforcing their
own rules for admission . . . .” Resolution 15, supra note 14; see also Akron LawIT, Miller
Becker: Navigating the Practice of Law in the Wake of Ethics 20/20 2013, YOUTUBE (Apr.
5, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2pf_MxxQdCM (predicting a regulatory system
in the next fifty years that permits lawyers who are admitted in one state to practice in other
states after notifying them and taking a preparatory course on local law).
157. LUBAN, supra note 121, at 251 (“[T]o deny someone [access and] equality before the
law delegitimizes our form of government.”); see Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the
Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3–10 (2012) (reporting that some experts
argue that corporate ownership of law firms, such as ownership by Wal-Mart, may result in a
more efficient and affordable delivery of legal services, increasing access to legal
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Both Resolution 15 and the LLLT rule are designed to promote consumer
welfare by enhancing competition for and access to the delivery of legal
services. Whether one or both will produce a net increase in consumer
welfare remains an open question. As the Washington Supreme Court said,
it has “[n]o . . . crystal ball” to predict the impact of APR 28.158 The same
might be said of Resolution 15. At the very least, however, both
developments loosen the profession’s monopolistic grip on the legal
services market. They also both offer significant promise of enhancing
competition in the delivery of legal services and overall consumer welfare.

representation, and identifying a First Amendment basis for corporations delivering legal
services through ownership of law firms).
158. In re Adoption of New APR 28—Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal
Technicians, No. 25700-A-10005, slip op. at 8 (Wash. June 15, 2012), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf.

